Fessler v. Kirk Sauer Comm Dev by unknown
2009 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-16-2009 
Fessler v. Kirk Sauer Comm Dev 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009 
Recommended Citation 
"Fessler v. Kirk Sauer Comm Dev" (2009). 2009 Decisions. 1738. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009/1738 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2009 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
CLD-90 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 08-3645
___________
JOSEPH A. FESSLER and ANN FESSLER,
Appellants
v.
KIRK SAUER, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT OF WILKES-BARRE; RICHARD
GELHARD, EX-DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE WILKES-BARRE
REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY; LOUIS ATTORDO, WILKES-BARRE
REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY; JOHN G. BRAVACOS, AREA DIRECTOR OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT; PAUL CAIN,
EX-AREA DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN
DEVELOPMENT; ALPHONSO JACKSON, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT; AND MARTIN CARLSON,
HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, ACTING US ATTORNEY
__________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 07-cv-1939)
District Judge:  Honorable Thomas I. Vanaskie
__________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to 
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
January 29, 2009
Before:  RENDELL, HARDIMAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Filed: March 16, 2009)
_________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_________
2PER CURIAM
Joseph Fessler and Ann Fessler appeal from an order of the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granting Defendants’ motions to dismiss on
grounds of claim preclusion.  For the reasons set forth below, we will summarily affirm. 
See I.O.P. 10.6.
On October 24, 2007, Joseph Fessler and Ann Fessler (“the Fesslers”), proceeding
pro se, filed an action against Kirk Sauer, Community Development of Wilkes-Barre;
Richard Gelhard, Ex-Deputy Executive Director of the Wilkes-Barre Redevelopment
Authority; Louis Attordo, Wilkes-Barre Redevelopment Authority; John G. Bravacos,
Area Director of the Department of Housing and Urban Development; Paul Cain, Ex-
Area Director of the Department of Housing and Urban Development; and Alphonso
Jackson, Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, related to their
dissatisfaction with the City of Wilkes-Barre Redevelopment Authority’s denial of a
relocation payment to the Fesslers.
In 1973, the Fesslers’ property was taken by eminent domain by the City of
Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania.  Following a denial of what they deemed an adequate
relocation benefit, the Fesslers filed numerous state and federal lawsuits against the City
of Wilkes-Barre Redevelopment Authority, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, and several of the organizations’ employees.  Prior to this action, the
Fesslers filed three previous lawsuits in the United States District Court for the Middle
    The Fesslers also appeal the District Court's decision to deny their motion for a default1
judgment against Defendant Alphonso Jackson.  We review an order denying a default
judgment for abuse of discretion.  See Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 164 (3d
Cir. 2000).  The District Court properly denied the Fesslers’ motion.  Because Plaintiffs’
Complaint presented no obvious federal claim, any default handed down would have been
subsequently set aside under Rule 55(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 55(c).
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District of Pennsylvania.  Following the Fesslers’ filing of an amended complaint in this
case, which did not substantively alter their claims, Defendants moved to dismiss the case
on the grounds that the Fesslers’ action was barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion. 
The Fesslers moved for default judgment against Defendant Alphonso Jackson on
grounds that he failed to timely answer their Complaint.  On August 22, 2008, the District
Court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss the case and denied the Fesslers’ motions
for default judgment.  The Fesslers filed a timely appeal and Defendants filed motions for
summary affirmance.
 II.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District
Court's application of claim preclusion is plenary.  See Venuto v. Witco Corp., 117 F.3d
754, 758 (3d Cir. 1997).   For the purposes of reviewing a motion to dismiss, we accept as1
true all allegations of the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn
therefrom.  See Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2006).
4III.
As the District Court noted, this case has a protracted history, involving multiple
lawsuits over several decades.  The District Court concluded that this action was merely
an attempt to re-litigate issues previously decided on the merits and dismissed the action
based upon the doctrine of claim preclusion.
The purpose of claim preclusion is to avoid piecemeal litigation of claims arising
from the same events.  See Bd. of Trs. of Trucking Employees of N. Jersey Welfare Fund,
Inc. v. Centra, 983 F.2d 495, 504 (3d Cir. 1992).  A party raising claim preclusion as an
affirmative defense must demonstrate that there has been (1) a final judgment on the
merits in a prior suit involving; (2) the same parties or their privities; and (3) a subsequent
suit on the same cause of action.  CoreStates Bank, N.A. v. Huls America, Inc., 176 F.3d
187, 194 (3d Cir. 1999).
The District Court determined that all three requirements were satisfied in this case
because the first federal action filed by the Fesslers in 1980 was decided on the merits. 
See Fessler v. Redevelopment Authority of the City of Wilkes-Barre, et al., Civil No. 80-
0141 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 1980), aff’d 681 F.2d 805 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
863.  In that case, the District Court explained that it did not have jurisdiction over the
Fesslers’ claims because no federally protected rights had been violated.  The Court held
that state law adequately protected the rights of individuals aggrieved by the state’s
exercise of its eminent domain power and that federal courts should not interfere.  See 
    Following that initial decision, the Fesslers filed two other federal lawsuits raising the2
same issue of their dissatisfaction with their relocation benefit.  See Fessler v. O’Karma,
et al., Civil No. 87-0849, slip op. (M.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 1989) and Fessler v. Finlayson, et al.,
Civil No. 89-1647, slip op. (M.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 1989).  In those cases, the District Court
dismissed the actions, at least in part, upon a determination that the Fesslers’ claims were
precluded by the initial federal-court decision..
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Elterich v. City of Sea Isle City, 477 F.2d 289, 291-92 (3d Cir. 1973).2
 Our review of the record indicates that the District Court dismissed the Fesslers’
1980 case it because lacked subject matter jurisdiction.  Thus, the merits of the case were
not reached.  While state court records might exist showing that the Fesslers raised their
claim of inadequate compensation in a prior state court action, thus providing a basis for
claim preclusion of a state court judgment, neither the District Court nor the parties have
provided us with those records.  See Logan v. Moyer, 898 F.2d 356, 357 (3d Cir. 1990)
(discussing the need for a complete record for appellate review of decisions based on
preclusion).  Nevertheless, our review of the Fesslers’ case shows that they have raised no
obvious federal claims.  Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219, 223-25 (1959).  An action
seeking adequate compensation after one’s property has been taken by a state is
appropriately raised in state court.  Id.  In addition, the Fesslers’ case concerns events
which occurred more than three decades ago and would have been appropriately
dismissed by the District Court as time-barred.  As there is no substantial question
presented by this appeal, we will summarily affirm.  See Third Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P.
10.6.
